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Justifying the culture of justification 
 
Abstract: The ideas of the culture of justification – according to which it is the role of the courts to 
ensure that every act of the state that affects a person is substantively justifiable – and the related 
right to justification – which claims that every person possesses a moral and, ideally, constitutional 
right to the justification that the culture of justification recommends – are intuitively powerful and 
widely discussed ideas in public law scholarship, but their moral foundation is not yet well 
understood. This paper presents the moral case for these two concepts which centres on the status of 
every person as a justificatory agent. It argues that under conditions of reasonable disagreement in 
politics, this status requires that any law or act be justified not only procedurally (for example, in 
terms of a democratic vote) but also substantively, and it further demonstrates the necessity of the 
judicial protection of the right to justification as a matter of principle.  
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The culture of justification and its slightly less well known sibling, the right to justification, 
are intuitively powerful concepts that are widely discussed in current public law 
scholarship, but their moral foundation is not yet well understood. What we do know is 
what the two terms broadly mean: in a culture of justification it is the role of the courts to 
ensure that every act of the state that affects a person is substantively justifiable to him or her; thus, 
to a considerable extent the government derives its legitimacy from the substantive 
justifiability of its actions, as opposed to considerations relating exclusively or primarily to, 
in particular, its democratic credentials. The right to justification expresses the same idea in 
moral terms; it insists that every citizen has a moral and, ideally, constitutional right to the 
kind of justification envisaged by the culture of justification.   
Furthermore, it is reasonably clear how the idea of a culture of justification operates in 
practice. The constitutional structure of states that are considered to have a culture of 
justification – countries that are mentioned in this context include Germany (as the 
paradigmatic example), the U.K. and other European countries, Canada, South Africa, and 
Israel1 – tends to display a number of features. According to Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Iddo 
Porat these include the relative absence of legal ‘black holes’ (implying the reviewability of 
 
1 Moshe Cohen-Eliya and Iddo Porat, Proportionality and Constitutional Culture (Cambridge University 
Press, 2013), 7. Cohen-Eliya and Porat contrast a culture of justification with a culture of authority, 
which in their view is the dominant legal culture in the U.S. I do not express a view in this paper with 
regard to the proper classification of U.S. legal culture.   
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all governmental actions),2 a broad scope of rights (which enables the comprehensive review 
powers of the constitutional court because every interference with a right triggers the duty 
of justification),3 the use of the doctrines of balancing and proportionality in order to assess 
the justifiability of an act,4 and a comparatively small role for the constitutional text 
(favouring an assessment of the substantive justifiability of an act without being constrained 
by the text of the constitution).5  
Thus, the meaning of the idea of a culture of justification is reasonably clear, and we know 
how it plays out in the constitutional life of a number of liberal democracies. However, as 
mentioned above, the question that is largely unresolved is about the moral appeal of the 
concept. Why, if at all, should we favour a culture of justification (and the right to 
justification) over other constitutional arrangements? This is the topic addressed by this 
essay.  
It proceeds in the following way. The next section provides a brief overview of the history of 
the concept and the scholarship on it. The third section moves towards the question of its 
moral appeal. It considers Rainer Forst’s idea of human rights as flowing from a basic right 
to justification and Mattias Kumm’s work on the right to justification as a condition of 
democracy, concluding that both authors stop short of providing a comprehensive moral 
case for the culture of justification and the corresponding right to justification. The fourth 
section builds on their work and presents an account of the moral foundation of the two 
concepts. I argue that Forst’s view of the person as a justificatory agent should be regarded 
as every person’s basic constitutional status. But, as Dimitrios Kyritsis has recently pointed 
out, it does not follow without further argument that the justification that every person is 
entitled to must be substantive (as the culture of justification would have it) as opposed to a 
procedural (in particular, democratic voting). I identify the notion of reasonable 
disagreement as the key to the resolution of this issue and show that if we acknowledge the 
centrality of reasonable disagreement in politics, we are indeed forced to accept that every 
person has a fundamental moral right to the substantive justification that the culture of 
justification insists on. This leads to the institutional question of whether the constitution 
should recognise a comprehensive constitutional right to justification that mirrors the moral 
right, or whether considerations relating, in particular, to the institutional competence of 
courts speak in favour of a more limited role for them. I show that an outcome-oriented 
approach to the question of institutional design is inappropriate and that the view of the 
person as a justificatory being that underlies the culture of justification requires the existence 
of the judicial protection of the right to justification as a matter of principle.  
 
 
2 Ibid., 113-117.  
3 Ibid., 118-119.  
4 Ibid., passim and in particular ch. 6.  
5 Ibid., 119-120.  
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II. The culture of justification 
The term ‘culture of justification’ was coined by the South African public law scholar 
Etienne Mureinik, who famously claimed with regard to the point of the Interim 
Constitution 1993 and in particular its Bill of Rights: 
‘If the new Constitution is a bridge away from a culture of authority, it is clear what it must be a bridge to. It 
must lead to a culture of justification – a culture in which every exercise of power is expected to be justified; in 
which the leadership given by government rests on the cogency of the case offered in defence of its decisions ... 
If the Constitution is to be a bridge in this direction, it is plain that the Bill of Rights must be its chief strut. A Bill 
of Rights is a compendium of values empowering citizens affected by laws or decisions to demand justification. 
If it is ineffective in requiring governors to account to people governed by their decisions, the remainder of the 
Constitution is unlikely to be very successful. The point of the Bill of Rights is consequently to spearhead the 
effort to bring about a culture of justification.’6 
This statement is remarkable and, indeed, radical, but the full extent of its radical nature can 
easily be overlooked. Mureinik makes four striking points, which I will explain by 
contrasting them with a more conventional approach. First, he stresses that ‘every’ exercise 
of power must be justified and that the Bill of Rights empowers citizens to demand 
justifications whenever they are ‘affected’ by laws or decisions. This gives an extraordinary 
scope to the duty of justification. A more conventional view might hold that citizens can 
demand justifications whenever their ‘fundamental rights’ have been limited; and here 
‘fundamental rights’ would refer to a limited number of specific rights, such as the rights of 
the South African constitution or the European Convention on Human Rights. This more 
conventional picture is however not Mureinik’s; he assumes a comprehensive duty of 
justification. And while the Bill of Rights is relevant in this context, it is only the tool used to 
bring about a culture of justification, not its source: the Bill of Rights must be interpreted so 
that it can serve what Mureinik identifies as its purpose, namely to bring about a culture of 
justification.7  
Second, the kind of justification that Mureinik has in mind is substantive and to be 
determined by moral argument, not by recourse to procedural or legal/constitutional values. 
Thus, for him every exercise of public power should be justifiable in the sense of what we 
may call ‘being supported by strong enough substantive reasons’. This contrasts with a more 
conventional approach to justification which might hold that the justification of a law 
consists in its having been passed in line with certain procedures (for example, by a 
democratically elected legislature) or in line with the values or rights set out in the text of the 
 
6 Etinenne Mureinik, ‘A Bridge to Where? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights’, 10 (1994) South 
African Journal on Human Rights 31, 32 (footnotes omitted). See further David Dyzenhaus, ‘Law as 
Justification: Etienne Mureinik’s Conception of Legal Culture’, 14 (1998) South African Journal of 
Human Rights 11.  
7 Mureinik does not, however, address the obvious follow-up question of whether the bill of rights 
should be interpreted to include a general right to liberty, meaning that indeed any act that affects 
someone is considered to limit a right and trigger the duty of justification. I will return to this point 
further below.  
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constitution. Mureinik is not interested in these latter kinds of justification but rather 
demands a substantive one.  
Third, since the bill of rights of the constitution is the ‘chief strut’ of the culture of 
justification, it follows that the primary responsibility for bringing it about lies with the 
courts, and ultimately the constitutional court. The culture of justification is therefore not 
simply, as a more conventional proponent might claim, a desirable state of affairs which 
should be promoted by various actors – say, the media in challenging official policy, the 
citizens by being alert and politically active, the legislature by debating carefully and 
conscientiously new legislation. For Mureinik, the primary responsibility lies with the courts 
in general and the constitutional court in particular.  
Fourth and finally, the project of bringing about a culture of justification is of crucial 
importance: if it fails, Mureinik warns, ‘the remainder of the Constitution is unlikely to be 
very successful’. Thus, the culture of justification is not simply, as a more conventional view 
might hold, ‘nice to have’. Rather, it is fundamental: it is the basis without the South African 
experiment of setting up an inclusive, liberal democracy cannot fully succeed.  
We can now summarise the idea of a culture of justification as insisting that citizens can rely 
on the bill of rights to challenge any act by the state which affects them; and that the courts, and in the 
final instance the constitutional court, have the responsibility of establishing whether the act in 
question is substantively justifiable. Mureinik wrote his paper with a view to a particular 
moment in the history of a particular country and did not draw on wider debates in 
constitutional theory; furthermore, he died shortly after its publication. Thus, we cannot 
know whether he intended the culture of justification to be as radical as his words indicate; 
nor can we know whether he would have recommended the culture of justification as a 
general model outside South Africa. Clearly, the ideas underlying his work are not 
specifically South African8 but rather flow from a certain reading of the tradition of liberal 
constitutionalism; therefore, the potential appeal of the culture of justification extends to 
other liberal democracies as well.9 This quality, in addition to its intuitive power, explains 
why it has become such a widely discussed concept since Mureinik’s first invocation of it. 
This discussion has various facets. Prominently among them is the question of the 
appropriate standard of review in administrative law: since a consensus quickly emerged 
that the proper doctrine to assess the justifiability of an act is proportionality (more on this 
below), the question arose of whether other standards of review, and in particular 
Wednesbury reasonableness, should be replaced with proportionality; this debate is still 
ongoing.10  
 
8 On the South African discussion, see Johan van der Walt and Henk Botha, ‘Democracy and Rights in 
South Africa: Beyond a Constitutional Culture of Justification’, 7 (2000) Constellations 341.  
9 See, for example, Grant Hooper, ‘The Rise of Judicial Power in Australia: Is There Now a Culture of 
Justification?’, 41 (2015) Monash University Law Review 102.  
10 See, in particular, David Dyzenhaus, Murray Hunt, and Michael Taggart, ‘The Principle of Legality 
in Administrative Law: Internationalisation as Constitutionalisation’, 1 (2001) Oxford University 
Commonwealth Law Journal 5, 29-32; Michael Taggart, ‘Reinventing Administrative Law’, in Bamforth 
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On a constitutional level, Cohen-Eliya and Porat have put forward the striking claim that the 
culture of justification is now ‘the emerging global legal culture’.11 They support this by 
pointing to a number of developments in the constitutional law of various liberal 
democracies. First and foremost, the global success of the principle of proportionality in 
human and constitutional rights law is an indicator of the growing influence of the culture 
of justification. Proportionality is a doctrine used in order to assess whether a limitation of a 
fundamental right is justified. Thus, human and constitutional rights law usually adopts the 
following two stage structure. At the first stage, the court asks whether the act in question 
has limited a fundamental right. If so, then at the second stage it examines whether this 
limitation is justified, and the test used to establish this is proportionality. The 
proportionality test has four steps: (1) legitimate goal (where the goal of the policy and its 
legitimacy have to be established); (2) suitability or rational connection (the question being 
whether the policy contributes to the achievement of the goal; in other words, whether there 
is a rational connection between the policy and the goal); (3) necessity (which examines 
whether there is a less restrictive but equally effective alternative); and (4) balancing (where 
the seriousness of the interference is balanced against the importance of the competing right 
or interest). Cohen-Eliya and Porat claim that proportionality is the tool used to assess the 
justifiability of state action: ‘At its core, [the culture of justification] requires that the 
government provide substantive justification for all of its actions, in that it must show the 
rationality and reasonableness of those actions and the tradeoffs they necessarily entail – in 
other words, the proportionality of its actions.’12  
 
and Leyland (eds.), Public Law in a Multi-Layered Constitution (Hart Publishing, 2003), 311, 332-334; 
Thomas Poole, ‘The Reformation of English Administrative Law’, 68 (2009) Cambridge Law Journal 142; 
David Dyzenhaus, ‘Proportionality and Deference in a Culture of Justification’, in Huscroft, Miller, 
and Webber, Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights, Reasoning, Justification (Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), 234; Mark Elliott, ‘From Bifurcation to Calibration: Twin-Track Deference and the 
Culture of Justification’, in Wilberg and Elliott, The Scope and Intensity of Substantive Review: Traversing 
Taggart’s Rainbow (Hart Publishing, 2015), ch. 4. For an overview of the different doctrinal approaches, 
see Thomas Poole and Sangeeta Shah, ‘A Very Successful Action? Historical Wrongs at Common 
Law’, LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 17/2016 (available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2869840), 17-20.  
11 Cohen-Eliya and Porat (above n 1), 7.  
12 Ibid., 7. On a normative level, Cohen-Eliya and Porat (ibid., ch. 4) prefer a different approach to 
justification, which they label the ‘intent-based model’ (as opposed to proportionality, which in their 
view represents an ‘impact-based model’). The intent-based model focuses on identifying the 
presence of impermissible, and therefore ‘excluded’, intentions or motives (for example, dislike of a 
certain group) in the decision-making process, whereas the impact-based model (in their view, 
proportionality) is about assessing whether the act in question is justifiable in terms of its impact, that 
is, if it optimises certain goods or values. Cohen-Eliya’s and Porat’s equation of proportionality with 
the impact-based model is, however, unfortunate because proportionality necessarily incorporates 
both elements – intent and impact – into its structure. At the first stage of the test, the legitimacy of the 
goal is examined; this corresponds to questioning what they call ‘intent’. In particular, moralistic or 
paternalistic goals (or ‘intents’) are considered impermissible and will therefore be excluded from the 
further analysis (on the centrality of excluded reasons arguments for proportionality analysis see 
Mattias Kumm, ‘Political Liberalism and the Structure of Rights: On the Place and Limits of the 
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The spread of proportionality is thus an indicator of the shift towards a culture of 
justification. However, as pointed out above, the culture of justification claims not only that 
infringements of rights have to be justified, it insists on the justification of any state action 
which affects a person. Cohen-Eliya and Porat observe that courts have relied on two 
strategies to achieve this. First, there is a trend towards the removal of barriers to judicial 
review (and thus the avoidance of legal ‘black holes’). Examples of this include the 
weakening or abolishing of ‘political question’ doctrines and the relaxation of the 
requirements for standing.13 Second, they observe an expansion of the scope of (prima facie) 
rights, which has the effect of subjecting more acts of the state to constitutional scrutiny and 
therefore strengthening the culture of justification.14 The most extreme example of this global 
trend is the German Federal Constitutional Court’s approach to the interpretation of Article 
2(1) of the Basic Law, which protects everyone’s right to freely develop his personality. The 
Court decided that this has to be understood as guaranteeing a right to freedom of action (to 
do as one pleases).15 The effect of this broad reading is that any state act which limits a 
person’s ability to do as he pleases interferes with a constitutional right and will therefore be 
subjected to proportionality analysis, in other words: it will require the justification that the 
culture of justification demands.  
 
Proportionality Requirement’, in Pavlakos (ed.), Law, Rights and Discourse: The Legal Philosophy of 
Robert Alexy (Hart, 2007), 131, 142-148; see further Kai Möller, The Global Model of Constitutional Rights 
(Oxford University Press, 2012), 183-193). The fourth stage of the proportionality assessment – the 
balancing stage – can be taken to represent what Cohen-Eliya and Porat call ‘impact’ in that here the 
impact of the policy on the right-holder and the competing public interest are weighed against each 
other. This utilisation of both intent and impact is normatively appropriate in a culture of justification; 
this can be explained in the following way. In a culture of justification, the role of proportionality is to 
assess whether a law or act is justifiable. Proportionality goes about this by first identifying those 
considerations which can properly be invoked in order to justify an act and excluding those which are 
impermissible (legitimate goal stage), in order to then ask whether the appropriate considerations do 
in fact justify the law or act in question (suitability, necessity, and, in particular, balancing stage). 
Thus, it is precisely the interplay between excluding impermissible considerations and then assessing 
the strength of the legitimate considerations that generates the appeal of a well-conducted 
proportionality analysis. For example, a properly conducted proportionality assessment of a 
prohibition on assisted suicide would exclude at the legitimate goal stage any goals relating to 
religious convictions about the sanctity of life, but it would regard as permissible the goal of 
preventing abuse of vulnerable people; at the final three stages of the test the strength of this reason 
would then be assessed in order to determine whether a prohibition of assisted suicide is justifiable in 
light of this permissible consideration. For a more comprehensive analysis of Cohen-Eliya’s and 
Porat’s view on this issue, see Kai Möller, ‘Authority and Intent in U.S. Constitutional Culture’, 10 
(2014) Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 123 (123-7); for Cohen Eliya’s and Porat’s reply see ‘Reply to 
Commentators on Proportionality and Constitutional Culture’, 10 (2014) Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 
159 (170-3).  
13 Ibid., 113-117.  
14 Ibid., 119.  
15 BVerfGE 6, 32 (1957) (Elfes).  
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Cohen-Eliya and Porat make two further observations in support of their claim that the 
culture of justification is now globally dominant. First, they observe a trend to award 
relatively little weight to the text of the constitution. Rather than applying a conventional set 
of interpretative methods to the constitutional text, courts tend to read constitutions in a 
way that requires or allows them to focus on the substantive justifiability of the act in 
question;16 this, again, is evidence of a move towards a culture of justification and 
corresponds to Mureinik’s insistence that the constitution ought to be interpreted in light of 
what he regards as its purpose, namely to bring about a culture of justification. Second, in a 
more cursory way they claim that in a culture of justification the judiciary is regarded, in an 
‘optimistic’ fashion, as an institution which possesses the ability to distinguish right from 
wrong and which can impose standards of rationality and reasonableness on other political 
actors,17 and that a culture of justification tends to promote what they refer to as a 
‘substantive’ or ‘deliberative’ conception of democracy which focuses not on the demands or 
claims of certain interest groups but rather on a collaborative effort to work out what is 
required by public reason.18  
 
III. The right to justification 
The shift towards a culture of justification is a development that requires not only an 
empirically, culturally and historically informed analysis but also, crucially, a moral one. 
Any moral defence of the culture of justification amounts to making a claim to the effect that 
every person is entitled to what Rainer Forst has called (in a different context, as we will see) 
the ‘right to justification’. This section looks at Forst’s and Mattias Kumm’s invocation of 
that idea. As we will see, there are important lessons to be learned from both authors, who 
however stop short of providing a comprehensive moral account of the culture of 
justification.  
 
1. Forst and the basic human right to justification 
The German philosopher Rainer Forst is well known for his view that there is a basic right to 
justification which grounds human rights. This sounds like a straightforward fit with the 
culture of justification, but as this section will show, the situation is more complex and 
ambiguous. However, his central idea, that is, the idea of humans as justificatory beings, will 
indeed be a building block in justifying the right to justification, as will become clear further 
below.  
Forst’s starting point is a particular view of human beings as justificatory beings: they ‘not 
only have the ability to justify or take responsibility for their beliefs and actions by giving 
 
16 Cohen-Eliya and Porat (above n 1), 119-120.  
17 Ibid., 120-121.  
18 Ibid., 121-122.  
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reasons to others, but in certain contexts they see this as a duty and expect that others will 
do the same.’19 Their basic right to justification flows from this quality and in turn grounds 
human rights.  
‘The normative basis for a conception of human rights is the right of every moral person to be respected as 
someone who has a moral right to justification ... This means that ... political or social structures or laws have to 
be based on or (at least) to be compatible with moral norms applicable to them and must be justifiable within 
appropriate legal and political structures (and practices) of justification.’20 
This statement can plausibly be read in the following way: human beings have human rights 
to live under morally justifiable legal and political (and one may add: constitutional) 
structures (for example, they have a human right to live in a democracy that respects the 
rule of law, the separation of powers, etc); and additionally their right to justification 
requires that any law that is applicable to them be morally justifiable. While in a way this 
view may be regarded as radical because it draws very demanding content from the concept 
of human rights, there is a moral clarity to it that strikes me as intuitively powerful: taking 
persons seriously as justificatory agents requires subjecting them to the coercive power of 
the law only when there is an adequate moral justification for this.  
There is, however, some evidence that this is not what Forst has in mind. He explains that 
the construction of human rights  
‘leads to a list of those basic rights that persons who respect one another as equals with rights to justification 
cannot properly deny each other. That kind of list ... expresses basic standards of respect that must be secured in 
the form of basic rights, given that this form has proven historically to be the appropriate one for safeguarding 
individual claims and entitlements.’21  
This indicates that for him human rights play a role that is more limited than it is under the 
culture of justification; under the latter a ‘list’ of rights is not needed (or, in any case, not 
central) because the culture of justification insists that all acts of the state need to be justified, 
not just those which interfere with one or more of the rights included in a ‘list’ of rights. So 
Forst’s view seems to be that in order to create a justified constitutional structure, it may be 
sufficient to guarantee the widely endorsed values of democracy, the rule of law, and the 
separation of powers as well as a bill (‘list’) of rights that protects certain individual claims 
and entitlements that, as history teaches us, require this special protection.  
Kyritsis has recently made a similar point with regard to the proper interpretation of Forst’s 
idea of the right to justification. He argues that we may concede that the right to justification 
requires that laws that affect a person be morally justifiable, but this does not require a 
justification for every individual law; rather, there is ‘an equally plausible alternative, 
namely that the demand for an adequate justification of the state’s coercive power is 
addressed further upstream, long before we get into concrete conflicts. It is resolved by our 
 
19 Rainer Forst, The Right to Justification (Columbia University Press, 2011), 1.  
20 Rainer Forst, ‘The Justification of Human Rights and the Basic Right to Justification: A Reflexive 
Approach’, 120 (2010) Ethics 711, 734. 
21 Ibid., 735.  
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joining the political condition.’22 Put differently, a law that burdens a person is justified by 
‘political legitimacy’, which for Kyritsis ‘requires that the political order as a whole is 
structured such that it reliably and systematically promotes justice’.23  
Kyritsis’ point nicely captures what I suspect is the most powerful objection to the culture of 
justification: that it is not clear why a substantive justification is needed for all laws, as 
opposed to a procedural one that stresses that a law can be justified by virtue of having been 
passed in a democratic (majoritarian) way. This is the crux of the moral case for the culture 
of justification, and Forst’s writings do not (directly) help us resolve it.  
 
2. Kumm and the conditions of democracy 
Mattias Kumm has argued that proportionality-based judicial review institutionalises a 
fundamental ‘right to justification’. His diagnosis of the current state of human and 
constitutional rights law will ring familiar in light of the above remarks on the culture of 
justification. He observes that the structure of human and constitutional rights law tends to 
follow a two stage approach, with a very broad scope of rights at the first stage, and a 
proportionality test at the second stage. He claims that the proportionality test 
institutionalises a test of public reason: ‘The proportionality test merely provides a structure 
for the demonstrable justification of an act in terms of reasons that are appropriate in a 
liberal democracy. Or to put it another way: it provides a structure for the justification of an 
act in terms of public reason.’24 The combined effect of the broad scope of rights at the first 
stage and this kind of proportionality test is that ‘the language of human and constitutional 
rights is used to subject practically all acts of public authorities that affect the interests of 
individuals to ... proportionality review and thus to the test of public reason.’25 This, of 
course, is very close to what Mureinik had called the culture of justification.  
Kumm then offers a moral defence of the right to justification that centres on the legitimacy 
conditions of democracy. He argues that the starting point of thinking about democracy 
should not be ‘majorities’ but rather ‘consent’: the consent of the governed. But since consent 
cannot usually be achieved in the real world, a surrogate is required. The conventional view 
would be that the appropriate surrogate lies in the idea of majority-voting and that therefore 
political decision-making is legitimate if the policy in question has been passed by a 
majority. Kumm disagrees: he says that we need two criteria which need to be cumulatively 
fulfilled for an act to be legitimate: first, there must be majoritarian decision-making based 
on an equal right to vote; and second, there must be an outcome-oriented test, namely that 
the outcome  
 
22 Dimitrios Kyritsis, Where Our Protection Lies (Oxford University Press, 2017), 66.  
23 Ibid. 
24 Mattias Kumm, ‘The Idea of Socratic Contestation and the Right to Justification: The Point of Rights-
Based Proportionality Review’, 4 (2010) Law & Ethics of Human Rights 141, 150.  
25 Ibid., 152.  
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‘must plausibly qualify as a collective judgment of reason about what the commitment to rights of citizens translates 
into under the concrete circumstances addressed by the legislation. Even if it is not necessary for everyone to 
actually agree with the results, the result must be justifiable in terms that those who disagree with it might 
reasonably accept.’26  
This reasoning is structurally similar to Ronald Dworkin’s well known defence of judicial 
review. Dworkin had argued that collective decision making is legitimate only when it 
respects the conditions of political community, and hence it must treat every member of the 
community as an equal partner, giving him a voice in the decision, a stake in it, and 
independence from it.27 In a structurally parallel but substantively different fashion, Kumm 
argues that collective decision making is about the collective resolution of reasonable 
disagreements about questions of policy. Thus, to be legitimate, a collective decision must 
choose one of the reasonable policy options; if it chooses an unreasonable one, it is acting 
illegitimately: 
‘Even those left worst off and most heavily burdened by legislation must be conceivable as free and equal 
partners in a joint enterprise of law-giving. Those burdened by legislation must be able to see themselves not 
only as losers of a political battle dominated by the victorious side (ah, the spoils of victory!), they must be able to 
interpret the legislative act as a reasonable attempt to specify what citizens – all citizens, including those on the 
losing side – owe to each other as free and equals.’28 
As this shows, Kumm attaches special significance to the idea of reasonable disagreement. 
His work is partly a response to Jeremy Waldron who argues that because there will usually 
be disagreement about questions of rights, and because this disagreement will usually be 
reasonable, it should be resolved by a democratic vote in parliament, as opposed to by 
judicial decision.29 Kumm’s response is that if the disagreement is really reasonable, the 
legislature’s decision indeed ought to stand, but that courts have a role to play in striking 
down unreasonable policies.  
The duty on the part of the community to treat every member of the community as a free 
and equal partner corresponds to the right of each member of a community to insist that a 
law that burdens him be a reasonable attempt of specifying his rights and duties; in other 
words: that it be justifiable to him, which is assessed with the help of the proportionality 
test. For Kumm the ‘right to contest’ is as fundamental as the right to vote because both 
rights reflect the two basic conditions of democracy: majority voting (which translates into 
the right to vote) and justifiability of a policy to every individual person (which translates 
into the right to contest/justification).30  
 
26 Ibid., 168, emphases in the original. 
27 Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (Harvard University 
Press, 1996), 24.  
28 Kumm (above n 24), 168.  
29 Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review’, 115 (2005-6) Yale Law Journal 1346; 
Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford University Press, 1999), Part III.  
30 Kumm (above n 24), 170-171.  
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The idea of reasonable disagreement, which features prominently in Kumm’s defence of the 
right to justification, will be discussed in the next section. At this point, my concern is a 
certain inbuilt limitation to the breadth of his theory. Kumm’s focus is on the relationship 
between democracy and human/constitutional rights, and accordingly he develops his 
account of the right to justification out of an analysis of the proper meaning of democracy. 
The downside of this argumentative route is that the full potential of the idea of a right to 
justification is not realised. First, while it is of course true that the core case of any defence of 
constitutional judicial review must be judicial review of primary legislation (because here 
the potential conflict with the value of democracy presents itself most starkly), the right to 
justification applies to all state action, including acts of the executive and judicial decisions. 
It seems implausible, however, to justify the right to justification with regard to actors other 
than the legislature on the basis of a proper understanding of democracy. Rather, and this 
leads to my second point, it would seem that a basic right to justification must flow not from 
the value of democracy but from a fundamental status of each person as a justificatory 
agent. So the order of the argument must be that the foundational status of a person is his or 
her status as a justificatory agent, which in turn necessitates a certain conception of 
democracy and human rights/judicial review. Fleshing this out in more detail will be the 
work of the next section.  
 
IV. Justifying the culture of justification 
The previous section has shown that Forst’s work on the right to justification does not 
without modification lend itself to justifying the culture of justification, and that Kumm’s 
work on the conditions of democracy is too narrow in its focus when it derives the right to 
justification from the value of democracy. This section builds on these two thinkers’ work 
and proposes an account of the legitimacy of state action that centres on Forst’s idea of the 
status of persons as justificatory agents and Kumm’s invocation of the idea of reasonable 
disagreement. It argues that under conditions of reasonable disagreement, the status of 
persons as justificatory agents requires that any act that burdens them be substantively 
justifiable to them, and that the judicial protection of the right to justification is required as a 
matter of principle.  
 
1. Human beings as justificatory beings 
Any attempted justification of the culture of justification must start with Forst’s idea of 
human beings as justificatory beings, that is, beings that not only have the ability to offer 
and receive reasons but that have a basic right to justification. And indeed, this idea must be 
correct (and is widely shared). The problem with it lies in the question, pointed out by 
Kyritsis,31 whether the right to justification requires in all cases a substantive justification, as 
 
31 See above n 22 and accompanying text.  
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the culture of justification would have it, or whether ordinarily a procedural justification – in 
the case of primary legislation this would be democratic voting – might suffice.  
 
2. Justification under conditions of reasonable disagreement 
I believe that the solution to this problem – procedural or substantive justification – lies in 
the idea and relevance of reasonable disagreement. This concept goes back to John Rawls, 
who had posed the following question: ‘Why does not our conscientious attempt to reason 
with one another lead to reasonable agreement?’32 To answer it, he claimed that the sources 
of reasonable disagreement (which he calls ‘the burdens of judgment’) are ‘the many 
hazards involved in the correct (and conscientious) exercise of our powers of reason and 
judgment in the ordinary course of political life’.33 This led him to conclude that ‘many of 
our most important judgments are made under conditions where it is not to be expected that 
conscientious persons with full powers of reason, even after free discussion, will arrive at 
the same conclusion.’34  
To demonstrate the centrality of the idea of reasonable disagreement for an assessment of 
the moral appeal of the culture of justification, let us consider two theoretical positions with 
regard to the role of reasonable disagreement in politics. According to the first (which I call 
position A), the notion of reasonable disagreement does not do much work in the sphere of 
political morality. Rather, under position A the relevant categories are simply right and 
wrong. For example, when the legislature debates a law that changes the economic policy of 
the country, an adherent of position A scrutinising this policy would come to the conclusion 
that this policy is either right or wrong: if it is right, it deserves to be passed, and if it is 
wrong, its passing would be, all things equal, a moral mistake. Of course, further 
distinctions can be made within the category of wrong policies: the range might be from 
‘mildly wrong’ to ‘catastrophically wrong’. But those further distinctions simply try to find a 
label for the gravity of the mistake made by the legislature; no further significance is 
attached to them.  
Under this framework, the culture of justification is morally indefensible. Remember that the 
culture of justification demands that any law that places a burden on a person be justifiable, 
and that the assessment of a law’s justifiability is carried out by the courts. In a moral 
universe where the relevant categories are right and wrong (and there is no, or little, room 
for that middle space of ‘wrong but reasonable’), the courts, when examining the policy, 
 
32 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1993), 55.  
33 Ibid., 55-56.  
34 Ibid., 58. In this passage, Rawls had in mind disagreements about the good; but, as Waldron has 
pointed out, the idea applies to disagreements about justice as well. See Waldron, ‘Deliberation, 
Disagreement, and Voting’, in Koh and Slye, Deliberative Democracy and Human Rights (Yale University 
Press, 1999), 210, 218 and Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford University Press, 1999), ch. 7. For a 
comprehensive discussion of the idea of reasonable disagreement, see Christopher McMahon, 
Reasonable Disagreement: A Theory of Political Morality (Cambridge University Press, 2009).  
13 
 
would only have the binary choice of either concluding that the policy was right – therefore 
upholding it as justifiable – or concluding that it was morally wrong – which would mean 
that it was unjustifiable and should be struck down. This implies that in this world the 
democratically elected legislature would be overruled by the courts whenever the courts 
came to the conclusion that the policy was not the best possible one, and this is plainly 
incompatible with the idea of democracy.  
Before moving on to consider position B (which endorses the existence and relevance of 
reasonable disagreement), let me offer my reasons why I am not impressed by position A. It 
offers no conceptual space for a distinction that we often make in political discussions: the 
distinction between a policy which we think is wrong but nevertheless reasonable, and an 
unreasonable policy. In the former case, we may strongly disagree with the policy – possibly 
considering it to be unjust or the consequences it is likely to bring about to be very harmful – 
but there is a sense of respect for the decision-maker because while we disagree with her 
decision, we do acknowledge that she did her job. By way of contrast, if we regard the 
decision as unreasonable, then the decision-maker has not done what she was elected or 
appointed to do, namely to govern the country (at least) reasonably. This difference matters; 
therefore, our conceptual apparatus should acknowledge it.35  
The point can be pushed further and it can be argued that our commitment to democracy is 
on much firmer ground if we acknowledge the frequent presence and relevance of 
reasonable disagreement. Imagine there are two competing policy proposals to deal with a 
certain issue. Under the framework of position A, at most one of them can be right and the 
other will be wrong. This makes it difficult (though not necessarily impossible) to justify 
why the choice between the two proposals should be made by way of majority voting: it 
seems that the mere fact of voting cannot lend a wrong policy the gloss of legitimacy and 
 
35 This paper cannot provide a comprehensive theory of reasonable disagreement; rather, it claims 
that its existence and relevance should be acknowledged because the alternative (position A) would 
be unappealing. There remains a considerable theoretical gap in our understanding of reasonable 
disagreement, especially with regard to the criteria that should be used to determine whether a 
specific act or policy is reasonable or not; and additionally, there will be reasonable disagreement 
about the limits of the reasonable (on this point see Kumm (above n 24), 170, fn. 56). An example to 
illustrate this point is the well-known controversy about whether torture can be justified in the 
‘ticking bomb’ scenario. Many would hold that the structure of the reasonable requires what I would 
loosely call a commitment to human dignity which makes torture not only wrong but even 
unreasonable in all circumstances; this is the view that by and large is taken by human and 
constitutional rights law (which prohibits torture absolutely, and therefore accepts no room for 
reasonable disagreement and, correspondingly, majoritarian decision-making with regard to torture). 
But others will disagree and claim that torture may not only be reasonable but in fact the right thing 
to do in certain circumstances. So the same act will be considered to be the best possible policy (the 
‘one right answer’) by some and outside even the realm of the reasonable by others. The example 
shows that from a philosophical perspective there is the need to develop a better understanding of the 
meaning and structure of reasonableness. It should also be noted, though, that courts are not 
particularly bothered by this gap in our theoretical understanding of reasonableness; judges using the 
proportionality method have developed a finely tuned sense of the borders between reasonable 
(proportionate) and unreasonable (disproportionate) policies.  
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that therefore truth, rather than majorities, should decide about which policy is adopted. By 
way of contrast, if the two policy proposals are both reasonable, then there is meaningful 
space for both a controversial discussion and a final vote at the end of the process. As 
Waldron puts it:  
‘I think we should start from a sense that there is likely to be a diversity of impartial opinions about justice or the 
good, and that consensus is not ordinarily to be expected on the subject matter of politics ... I want ... to call for 
the development of a theory of democracy that makes voting the natural culmination of deliberation, rather than 
an indication that deliberation has in some sense been inadequate.’36 
A third and final reason why we should be hesitant to disregard the role of reasonable 
disagreement is that courts around the world routinely rely on a ‘middle space’ between 
right and wrong: they routinely stress that their job is not to second-guess the wisdom of the 
original decision-maker’s decision and that their role is correspondingly more limited.37 This 
means that they maintain that there must a meaningful ‘middle space’ between rightness 
and wrongness: there must be the possibility for them to say: ‘We are not deciding here 
whether this policy is right or wrong. But we are deciding whether it is justifiable, and this is 
a different standard.’ It would seem that the only coherent ‘middle space’ lies in the idea of 
reasonableness:38 this concept points precisely to the possibility of a view that may not be 
right while simultaneously being justifiable.39  
In light of this, let us consider the second theoretical position – position B –, which awards a 
prominent place to the idea of reasonable disagreement. Thus, this approach initially makes 
a distinction not between right and wrong but between reasonable and unreasonable; the 
 
36 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Deliberation, Disagreement, and Voting’ (above n 34), 218.  
37 See Kai Möller (above n 12), 200-202 with various examples from the case law.  
38 This should not be confused with ‘Wednesbury reasonableness’, the standard of review used in 
English administrative law; rather it is a concept of reasonableness as used in moral and political 
philosophy. This is not the place to investigate the relationship between ‘real’ reasonableness and 
Wednesbury reasonableness, but it is probably largely uncontroversial (as well as correct) to say that 
Wednesbury reasonableness as traditionally applied amounts to something akin to reasonableness 
combined with considerable additional deference; thus, this kind of Wednesbury reasonableness is 
not sufficient in a culture of justification. The doctrinal test that reflects the necessity to separate 
reasonable from unreasonable laws and acts is, of course, proportionality. The structured nature of 
the proportionality test with its four separate stages lends itself more easily to a more searching form 
of review than the unstructured Wednesbury test. However, it is also important to note that this 
difference between Wednesbury reasonableness and proportionality is not a matter of conceptual 
truth but simply reflects how the two doctrines have come to be understood in legal practice: the 
degree of deference that courts use when they apply Wednesbury reasonableness or proportionality 
is flexible; and it should be noted that proportionality is often justifiably applied with a degree of 
deference as well (on this point see below 3.b).  
39 Dyzenhaus makes a substantively similar claim, without however relying on the notion of 
reasonable disagreement: ‘[The administrative state’s] decisions should survive review as long as they 
are shown by the reasons provided to be justifiable, rather than because the conclusion reached by the 
body happens to coincide with the conclusion that the judge would have considered correct without 
the benefit of engagement with the administrative body’s reasoning. The culture of justification 
delineates and enforces the separation of powers.’ (Dyzenhaus above n 10 at 255).  
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category of reasonable then includes the ‘right’ (as in, the ‘best possible’) and ‘wrong’ (‘not 
the best possible but still reasonable’) decisions.40  
Since this approach draws a distinction between reasonable and unreasonable, it is, contrary 
to approach A, compatible with the idea of a culture of justification. A proponent of 
approach B can maintain that any act of the state needs to be justifiable and that the courts 
should enforce this: justifiability, for approach B, means that the policy must be reasonable, 
and this creates no problems for democracy because it leaves enough leeway for democratic 
bodies to choose between different (reasonable) policies.  
This does not yet answer the question, posed at the end of the previous section, of whether 
the right to justification really demands a substantive justification (as the culture of 
justification would have it). The question is whether it is appealing to maintain that a policy 
which is unreasonable can be justified to a person burdened by it by virtue of having been 
passed by a democratically elected legislature. I can see no reason why this should be so. 
The job of the legislature is to pass policies that are at least reasonable, whereas it fails to do 
its job when it passes unreasonable policies. There is simply no moral reason to value the 
freedom of the legislature (and, by implication, the freedom of the voters whom it 
represents) to pass laws that are not even reasonable when it could just as well have passed 
a reasonable law. It follows that under approach B, which rightly awards a prominent place 
to the notion of reasonable disagreement, the right to justification requires that any policy 
which places a burden on someone be substantively (reasonably) justifiable.  
 
3. The institutional question 
a) Judicial review as a matter of principle 
The last building block of my defence of the culture of justification is the institutional issue. 
So far I have shown that as a matter of political morality, every person holds a right to 
justification which requires that any policy which places a burden on him be reasonably 
justifiable to him. This section shifts the discussion from morality to institutional design and 
asks whether the right to justification ought to be constitutionally protected and judicially 
enforced.  
According to what strikes me as the most wide-spread approach to the issue of the 
relationship between moral and institutional questions, institutional design is a tool whose 
purpose it is to facilitate bringing about desirable outcomes. Thus, if the desirable outcome 
is the adequate protection of fundamental rights, then under this view judicial review is 
justified if it brings about a level of protection of fundamental rights that is better than under 
alternative institutional arrangements. A paradigmatic statement of this view can be found 
in Ronald Dworkin’s discussion of judicial review: 
 
40Alternatively one could speak, as Rawls does, of truth and falsity. See Rawls (above n 32), 58: ‘Some 
conflicting reasonable judgments ... may be true, others false; conceivably, all may be false.’ 
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“I see no alternative but to use a result-driven rather than a procedure-driven standard for deciding [institutional 
questions]. The best institutional structure is the one best calculated to produce the best answers to the essentially 
moral question of what the democratic conditions actually are, and to secure stable compliance with those 
conditions. A host of practical considerations are relevant, and many of these may argue forcefully for allowing 
an elected legislature itself to decide on the moral limits of its power. But other considerations argue in the 
opposite direction, including the fact that legislators are vulnerable to political pressures of manifold kinds, both 
financial and political, so that a legislature is not the safest vehicle for protecting the rights of politically 
unpopular groups.”41 
We can quickly see that Dworkin’s, or indeed any, result-driven approach does not quite ‘fit’ 
in the case of the right to justification; this can be explained in the following way. We might 
say that the outcome that the right to justification wants to achieve is justifiable policies and 
acts, and that therefore, under a result-driven approach, the question should be whether the 
existence of judicial review of all state actions that burden someone is likely to lead to a state 
of affairs where more state action is justifiable than under alternative arrangements. From 
this starting point, we could then delve into a discussion of those areas and considerations 
where it seems likely that courts will make a contribution to the overall justifiability of 
policies and acts and those where this seems less likely.  
What this picture misses, however, is that the right to justification properly understood 
cannot be seen to be exclusively concerned with the outcome or result of ‘justifiable policies’. 
Rather, it must also insist that every person has the right to challenge any act or policy that 
imposes a burden on him. This follows from the conception of the person that underlies the 
right to justification: persons are seen as justificatory agents, that is, agents whose status 
allows them to challenge and demand adequate reason for any law or act that relevantly 
affects them. The protection of this status requires not only certain outcomes (justifiable 
policies) but also the availability of the corresponding procedures that allow a justificatory 
agent to have an independent and impartial person or body assess the justifiability of an act 
that burdens her; put differently, this status requires the availability of judicial review.42  
The above argument is related to Alon Harel’s important defence of a ‘right to a hearing’.43 
Harel defends judicial review as a matter of principle (and thus independently of what he 
calls ‘instrumentalist’ considerations). While his argument rests on propositions that are 
structurally different from the right to justification and cannot, therefore, be applied without 
modifications to the issue at stake in this paper, I believe that Harel’s insights are even more 
forceful in the case of the right to justification than under the propositions that he accepts. 
 
41 Dworkin (above n 27), 34.  
42 One might object to this claim that the justificatory agent is not necessarily entitled to a judicial 
process, and that therefore other, non-judicial avenues of justification might be considered. In reply to 
this, I employ an argument parallel to Alon Harel’s (whose general approach to the necessity of 
judicial review I discuss below) and claim that the right to justification requires that there must be an 
opportunity to raise grievances; these grievances must be examined and if necessary the original 
decision must be reconsidered. Any institution that provides this should properly considered to be a 
court according to the logic that ‘if it walks like a duck, quacks like a duck, looks like a duck, it must 
be a duck’. See Alon Harel, Why Law Matters (Oxford University Press, 2014), 214. 
43 Harel (above n 42), ch. 6.  
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His view of rights is traditional in that he assumes not a right to justification (that is, a right 
to be subjected only to justifiable laws and acts) but rather a number of discrete rights (such 
as, say, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, etc.). On this basis, he defends a right to a 
hearing in situations where there is a dispute about whether a particular right has been 
justifiably infringed or about the very existence of a particular right (a paradigmatic example 
of the first situation would be a law that prohibits obscene speech and therefore limits the 
right to freedom of speech; an example of the second scenario would be where the right-
holder claims a right to an education and it is unclear whether such a right actually exists).44 
So while Harel does not base his theory on any particular conception of rights, his starting 
point makes it clear that he does not believe in one general right to justification.45  
With this in mind, let us look at his defence of a right to a hearing. With regard to the first 
situation (which is closer to the issue at stake here), Harel argues: 
‘There is ... an important link between individual rights and the right to a hearing. The existence of a prima facie 
right gives the right-holder a stake in that right and power over it, even when the right is justifiably overridden. 
The right to a hearing is grounded in the fact that people occupy a special position with respect to their rights. 
Rights demarcate a boundary that has to be respected, a region in which the right-holder is a master ... A 
determination that the right has been justifiably infringed does not nullify the privileged position of the right-
holder. Instead, his privileged position is made concrete by granting the right-holder a right to a hearing. Thus, 
infringing the right unilaterally is wrong even when the infringement itself is justified because the right-holder is 
not treated as someone who has a say in the matter.’46 
Elsewhere, Harel speaks of the ‘fingerprint’ or ‘moral residue’ that a right leaves even if it is 
justifiably infringed.47 The idea is that a moral right to X means not only that X has to be 
respected but also that, if it is justifiably not respected, the right-holder is owed a hearing. 
Harel develops his approach largely by way of reasoning by analogy; this makes it difficult 
to pin down its core proposition from which the right to a hearing flows. I wonder whether 
his idea can be expressed in a simpler and more forceful way by recurring to the notion of 
people as justificatory agents: if we treat people as justificatory agents, and if we accept that 
they have rights – independently of whether they have a set of specific rights (traditional 
view) or a broad right to justification (as the culture of justification would have it) – then this 
means that they must be given the opportunity to demand acceptable reasons for any act 
that can plausibly be regarded as violating a right. Denying them this opportunity treats 
them, in Harel’s words, ‘as someone who [does not have] a say in the matter’.  
 
b) Deference in the culture of justification 
There may be a tension between the moral necessity of judicial review in a culture of 
justification as defended in the previous section and the occasionally limited institutional 
 
44 Ibid., 203.  
45 On this point see also his ‘Do Legal Rights Matter? Comments on the Global Model of 
Constitutional Rights’, 10 (2014) Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 187.  
46 Harel (above n 42), 204-205.  
47 Ibid., 209.  
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competence of courts to carry out this review. As is widely accepted, despite their 
considerable institutional strengths (including independence and impartiality), courts 
struggle with the problem of institutional competence in some situations and in response to 
this problem have developed tools such as the doctrines of deference or the margin of 
appreciation48 that are usually integrated into the application of the proportionality test and 
that allow them to defer to the original decision-maker to an extent.49 The problem with 
deference, however, is that it may result in a court upholding a law or act as proportionate 
and therefore justifiable when in reality it is not.50 How does this relate to the moral 
necessity of protecting people’s fundamental right to justification? 
For a proponent of the view that judicial review is justified only to the extent that it 
promotes better outcomes than alternative arrangements, deference does not pose a 
problem; on the contrary, it is one of the tools that ensures that judges remain within their 
zone of competence and therefore produce decisions that will really improve the quality of 
rights protection. Under the view taken in this paper, the situation may seem more 
complicated because I argued that judicial review must exist not to improve outcomes but 
rather as a matter of principle. One way of dealing with this problem, albeit not a convincing 
one, is to deny it. Harel comes close to doing this when he writes:  
The right-to-a-hearing conception dictates that individual grievances are seriously considered and evaluated, and 
that the institutions designed to investigate these grievances are engaged in good faith and serious moral 
deliberation ... [T]his conception ... maintains that courts ought to engage in serious good-faith deliberation in 
order to honour that right. It is unlikely that such serious good-faith deliberation fails to protect rights in an 
adequate manner.51 
 
48 The doctrine of the margin of appreciation is used by the European Court of Human Rights and 
was introduced in the famous Handyside case, where the Court held: ‘By reason of their direct and 
continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, State authorities are in principle in a better 
position than the international judge to give an opinion on the exact content of these requirements as 
well as on the “necessity” of a “restriction” or “penalty” intended to meet them.’ (Handyside v. United 
Kingdom, (1979-80) 1 E.H.R.R. 737, 753-754).  
49 Some scholars also discuss a second ground for deference, namely ‘democratic legitimacy’; see Alan 
Brady, Proportionality and Deference under the UK Human Rights Act: An Institutionally Sensitive 
Approach (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 106. Under the approach proposed in this article, there 
is little or no room for deference on the grounds of democratic legitimacy because the whole point of 
the culture of justification is that every act by the democratic legislator needs to be substantively 
justifiable. But the standard applied to assess the justifiability of a law or act, namely 
proportionality/reasonableness, does of course leave considerable room to the democratic decision-
maker. More as a matter of conceptual clarity than as a substantive issue, I believe that it is preferable 
to avoid referring to the corresponding leeway that courts grant the original decision-makers as 
‘deference’; I would prefer to say that courts are assessing the justifiability (that is, reasonableness, 
proportionality) of the original decision without any deference on the grounds of democratic 
legitimacy. 
50 On this dilemma, see Alexy A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford University Press, 2002), 422-
425. 
51 Harel (above n42), 211 (emphasis added).  
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It is notable that in an earlier version of this passage, Harel had used the word 
‘inconceivable’ instead of the much weaker ‘unlikely’ that appears in his book.52 So he seems 
to have softened his stance on this issue. Nevertheless, he fails to appreciate the problems 
involved in judicial review; while it is of course true that courts are expected to engage in 
serious and good faith deliberation, often the empirical basis of the policy or act in question 
is so complicated that the court has no choice but to defer, to an extent, to the judgment of 
the original decision-maker.53  
I believe that deference can be reconciled with the acknowledgement of the necessity of 
judicial review in a straightforward way. Due deference does not offend people’s right to 
justification for the simple reason that a person cannot have a right to a justification that 
provides more than what a court that looks at the issue ‘with an open heart’ (Harel) can be 
expected to deliver. Justificatory practices are human practices and therefore subject to 
human limitations, including human limitations with regard to epistemic issues. So a 
justificatory agent demanding a justification cannot expect more than other humans (that is, 
judges) doing their job to the best of their ability. If a court is hampered by its lack of 
empirical or, probably less relevant, normative understanding of the issue, then some 
measure of deference may be entirely appropriate. Thus, while such deference is always a 
reason for regret, it is compatible with the right to justification.  
 
V. Conclusion 
This essay has provided a moral defence of the culture of justification, that is, the idea that 
all laws and other acts of the state that affect a person must be substantively justifiable to 
that person and that individuals can rely on their constitutional rights to enforce this in 
court. As has become clear, the culture of justification is not only an influential idea and 
empirically successful practice in various liberal democracies around the world; it is also 
morally justifiable and indeed morally obligatory. My argument to this effect has relied on 
three building blocks. First and foremost, the foundation of the culture of justification lies in 
the fundamental status of each person as a justificatory agent, that is, an agent who has a 
right to justification. Second, it follows from the existence and moral relevance of reasonable 
disagreement that the right to justification demands that any act that affects a person be (at 
least) reasonable. Third, the status of persons as justificatory agents, that is, agents who can 
 
52 Alon Harel and Tsvi Kahana, ‘The Easy Core Case for Judicial Review’, 2 (2010) Journal of Legal 
Analysis 227, 247. 
53 Even Robert Alexy, who is otherwise a staunch defender of judicial review, has come to integrate 
the need for deference into his structural theory of constitutional rights by adding (in the Postscript to 
the English publication of A Theory of Constitutional Rights) his ‘Second Law of Balancing’, a formal 
principle according to which the more intensive an interference in a constitutional right is, the greater 
must be the certainty of its underlying premises. See Alexy (above n 50), 418-419. For a critical 
analysis of this idea, see Matthias Klatt and Johannes Schmidt, ‘Epistemic Discretion in Constitutional 
Law’, 10 (2012) International Journal of Constitutional Law 69. For a comprehensive study of this issue in 
the U.K. context and based on a largely Alexian framework, see Brady (above n 49). 
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demand acceptable reasons, implies that the right to justification must be institutionally 
protected; in other words, the existence of judicial review is required as a matter of principle.  
What follows? The moral appeal of the culture of justification gives, in particular, judges and 
public law scholars good reason to continue with the project that, as Cohen-Eliya and Porat 
have shown, is already in full swing in the liberal democratic world: the gradual 
transformation and reinterpretation of constitutional law and doctrines so as to make them 
consistent with the requirements of the culture of justification. This includes the broadening 
of the scope of (prima facie) rights (as championed by the German Federal Constitutional 
Court); the adoption of proportionality not only in constitutional but also in administrative 
law and the proper conceptualisation of that test as one that is concerned with 
distinguishing reasonable from unreasonable disagreement; the acknowledgment of the 
need for deference combined with the attempt to limit its breadth to cases where courts 
suffer from a lack of institutional competence; and more generally, the interpretation of 
constitutional clauses in line with the division of labour that the culture of justification 
recommends. This development towards a culture of justification is of great moral 
importance: we owe it to others and to ourselves, as justificatory agents, to make it a success.  
 
